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Abstract
An intelligent agent performs actions in order to achieve its goals. Such ac-
tions can either be externally directed, such as opening a door, or internally di-
rected, such as writing data to a memory location or strengthening a synaptic
connection. Some internal actions, to which we refer as computations, poten-
tially help the agent choose better actions. Considering that (external) actions and
computations might draw upon the same resources, such as time and energy, de-
ciding when to act or compute, as well as what to compute, are detrimental to the
performance of an agent.
In an environment that provides rewards depending on an agent’s behavior,
an action’s value is typically defined as the sum of expected long-term rewards
succeeding the action (itself a complex quantity that depends on what the agent
goes on to do after the action in question). However, defining the value of a com-
putation is not as straightforward, as computations are only valuable in a higher
order way, through the alteration of actions.
This thesis offers a principled way of computing the value of a computation
in a planning setting formalized as a Markov decision process. We present two
different definitions of computation values: static and dynamic. They address
two extreme cases of the computation budget: affording calculation of zero or
infinitely many steps in the future. We show that these values have desirable
properties, such as temporal consistency and asymptotic convergence.
Furthermore, we propose methods for efficiently computing and approximat-
ing the static and dynamic computation values. We describe a sense in which
the policies that greedily maximize these values can be optimal. Furthermore,
we utilize these principles to construct Monte Carlo tree search algorithms that
outperform most of the state-of-the-art in terms of finding higher quality actions
given the same simulation resources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“First say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do.”
– Epictetus, Discourses
Imagine you are playing chess in a tournament, contemplating your next move. You have
already considered some sequences of moves, and it seems like moving your c-pawn is your
best bet—but you are not entirely sure. Should you think further? Or should you save your
time for later in the game? Let us say you decide that you are at a critical point in game,
and thinking further is well worth your limited clock-time. Then should you spend your time
considering the c-pawn move further, to see if it as good as you think it is? Or should you
instead think about bringing your bishop into the game, which seems like your best alternative?
Maybe, instead, you should look around on the board to see if there are any promising moves
that you have not considered yet?
Such questions do not only concern chess players. Rather, variants of them present them-
selves on a daily basis, where one has to decide between thinking and acting, as well as what
to think about. Reckless behavior, “analysis-paralysis”, or rumination might be seen as neg-
ative consequences resulting from too little, or too much, thinking than is ideal; or thinking
about the “wrong” things.
An intelligent robot (or its programmer) has to deal with the same questions as well. For a
mobile robot, acting and computing (i.e., thinking) often draw upon the same resources such
as time and energy. Therefore, a resource-bounded robot needs a policy to decide when to act,
when to compute, and what to compute.
In this thesis, we address these questions by proposing ways in which one could assign
values to computations—which is typically1 referred to as the value of computation (VOC).
We do so by operating in a Bayesian framework, where the agent is uncertain about the values
of possible actions, and decreases its uncertainty by performing computations.
As we later discuss, this is not a straightforward task for a variety of reasons. For instance,
the value of an action does not only depend on the present computation, but it also depends
on future computations. A chess player running out of clock-time might decide to ignore a
seemingly complicated move if she thinks she might not have enough time to think properly
through all the complications resulting from the move.
This problem could be addressed by our proposal to some extent. We propose static and
dynamic action value functions, which respectively cover the the two extremes of zero and
1We build upon the existing body of literature on VOC-like measures, which we discuss later in this chapter.
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infinitely many future computations. Furthermore, we argue that the current work on VOC-
like measures and relating topics are limited in two severe ways: (I) they exclusively focus on
what we refer to as static values—ignoring effects of future computations, (II) they assume a
bandit-like scenario where action values are stationary—whereas, in planning, action values
improve in expectation as the agent performs more computations. Our formulations address
these two limitations.
In the theoretical part of the thesis, we discuss the properties of static and dynamic values,
and define the value of computation as the expected increase in these values. We show that
choosing static/dynamic-value-maximizing computations is optimal in certain cases. Further-
more, we provide exact and efficient approximate algorithms for computing these values. In
the applied part of the thesis, we give a Monte Carlo tree search algorithm based on VOC-
maximization. We empirically demonstrate its efficacy by comparing it against other popular
or similar methods in two different environments.
Before moving on to our discussion of computation values in the next chapter, we first
provide some mathematical background, which will form the basis of our work. Then we
discuss some of the work relating to this thesis below. Lastly provide an outline of the thesis.
1.1 Preliminaries
Below, we introduce multi-armed bandit problems and Markov decision process, which we
will utilize heavily throughout this thesis.
1.1.1 Multi-armed bandit problems
A multi-armed bandit (MAB, or simply bandit) problem is composed of a set of actions A,
where each action is associated with a distinct reward distribution function. Let Q : A → R
be the expected reward function: Q(a) = E[rt|at = a].
The goal then is to minimize some form of regret. In this thesis, we define it as the expected
reward one misses out by taking action at, R(t) = maxaQ(a)−Q(at). For instance, one can
aim to minimize cumulative regret,
∑∞
t=0R(t); or simply the regret R(t) at a particular t,
which is referred to as simple regret. In either case, the actor cannot directly observe the
regret, as Q is unknown, but typically forms estimates of it.
1.1.2 Markov decision processes
A finite Markov decision process (MDP) is a 5-tuple 〈S,A,P ,R, γ〉, where
• S is a finite set of states
• A is a finite set of actions
• P is the transition function such that Pass′ = P (st = s′|st = s, at = a), where s, s′ ∈ S
and a ∈ A
• R is the expected immediate reward function such that Rass′ = E[rt+1|st = s, at =
a, st+1 = s
′], where again s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A
• γ is the discount factor such that γ ∈ [0, 1).
We assume an agent interacts with the environment via a (potentially stochastic) policy
pi, such that pi(s, a) = P (at = a|st = s). This quantity is typically conditioned on some
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parameters which determine the policy of the agent, which is left out from the notation here.
The agent aims to maximize the the expected value of the cumulative discounted rewards
Epi [Rt| st = s], where Rt =
∑∞
i=0 γ
irt+i, by controlling its policy pi.
These expected values are typically estimated by planning and reinforcement learning
methods in some form. As such, they get a preferential treatment in terms of the notation,
and simply get referred to as values, which is given by value functions. The value of a state s
is given by the value function V pi:
V pi(s) = Epi [Rt| st = s] . (1.1)
Similarly, the value of a state-action s, a is given by the value function Qpi:
Qpi(s, a) = Epi [Rt| st = s, at = a] . (1.2)
Both of these value functions can be defined recursively, by relating a state (or a state-
action) to its neighboring states (or state-actions), by the Bellman equations:
Qpi(s, a) =
∑
s′
Pass′
[
Rass′ + γ
∑
a′
pi(s′, a′)Qpi(s′, a′)
]
(1.3)
V pi(s) =
∑
a
pi(s, a)
∑
s′
Pass′ [Rass′ + γV pi(s′)] . (1.4)
Solving a planning or a reinforcement learning problem boils down to find an optimal
policy pi∗ that is better than all other policies. In other words, for an optimal policy pi∗
pi∗ = arg max
pi
V pi(s) (1.5)
must hold for all s.
State and state-action values of an optimal policy are given respectively by the optimal
state value function V ∗ and the optimal state-action value function Q∗. Formally,
V ∗(s) = V pi
∗
(s) = max
pi
V pi(s) (1.6)
for all s and
Q∗(s, a) = Qpi
∗
(s, a) = max
pi
Qpi(s, a) , (1.7)
for all s and a. These optimal value functions can also be defined recursively, through what
we refer to as the Bellman optimality equations:
Q∗(s, a) =
∑
s′
Pass′
[
Rass′ + γ
∑
a′
max
a′
Q∗(s′, a′)
]
(1.8)
V ∗(s) = max
a′
∑
s′
Pass′ [Rass′ + γV ∗(s′)] . (1.9)
1.2 Related work
We draw upon two different lines of research. The first considers the value of resolving one’s
uncertainty, and relates to ideas such as the value of information, knowledge gradients, and
metareasoning. The second line is concerned with finding approximately optimal actions in
known environments—that is, approximate planning.
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1.2.1 Information values and metareasoning
We draw heavily on Howard’s work on information value theory [1], which is concerned with
the economic advantage gained through reducing one’s uncertainties. The original form of this
work addresses the questions of how much one should pay to obtain a piece of information.
The problem we investigate in this thesis is analogous. However, instead of the value of an
external piece of information, we are interested in the value of an internal piece of information,
which results from thinking or computing.
Formal approaches to this problem include the work of Russell and Wefald [2]. This
lays down the theoretical foundations of rational metareasoning which concerns finding and
performing optimal internal actions (i.e., computations). However, as noted by the authors,
solving the metareasoning problem optimally—meaning performing the optimal sequence of
computations—is intractable for several reasons. One of the reasons is that optimal metear-
easoning is a harder computational problem than optimal reasoning, as recently proven by
Lin et. al. [3] for a general class of problems. This is because, finding the optimal solution
to the metareasoning problem comes with a great computational burden at the level of meta-
metareasoning, optimization of which requires even a more meta reasoner. In other words,
optimality at one level can only be achieved with a great cost at the one higher (more meta)
level. One reason for this is that (meta) state and action spaces grow as one goes up the metar-
easoning hierarchy. In many settings with a good reasoner, perfect metareasoning is likely to
perform worse than no-metareasoning—in the sense that the latter obtains the same solution
but at a lower computational cost. This being said, some metareasoning can be better than the
two extremes.
We can perhaps better understand this with a neural networks analogy. Consider three ways
of updating the weights of a network: random walk, stochastic gradient descent (SGD), and
Newton’s method. Random walk is the cheapest to compute (similar to no-metareasoning) but
performs the worst. Newton’s method is similar to perfect meta-reasoning as it is the costliest
to compute, but is locally optimal. However, SGD, which falls between the two in terms
of computational costs performs often the best—even though its updates are noisy and thus
suboptimal. One reason is that the computations spent on performing one “optimal” update
can be more spent on performing many sub-optimal updates, which often yields better results
in practice.
Thus, Hay and others [4, 5] utilize “myopic” metareasoning—which is akin to performing
computations that maximize the immediate (rather than the long-term) rewards of the meta-
level problem2—to outperform non-meta reasoners in the context of approximate planning.
A parallel line of progress has recently been made by Ryzhov, Frazier, Powell, and their
colleagues [6, 7, 8]. They propose the knowledge gradient (KG)—which closely resembles
Howard’s information values—and show that it solves Bayesian optimization (specifically,
selection and ranking) problems effectively.
We can consider two kinds of planning problems: “stateless” and “stateful”. In the former,
outcomes of actions are path independent. That is, if two action sequences are permutations
of each other, then they must be equally rewarding in expectation. Whereas, path-dependence
may exist in the latter kind. To elaborate, in stateful problems, actions not only yield rewards,
but they also modify the state of the agent. Therefore, the ordering of actions do impact the
reward expectations. Multi-armed bandits are examples of stateless problems, and Markov
2The definition of which can be found in the cited work.
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decision processes of stateful problems typically.
To the best of our knowledge, all the work on rational metareasoning and knowledge gra-
dients either focus on stateless problems, or they treat stateful problems as stateless problems.
For example, in rational-metareasoning-based Monte Carlo tree search [4], the authors make
a simplifying statelessness assumption by treating the root actions as “bandit arms” with fixed
quantities of expected rewards attached—even though the rewards depend on the policy of the
agent, and thus are not fixed. As also noted by the authors, this is perhaps the most signifi-
cant shortcoming of their method. In this thesis we partially lift this constraint, by extending
metareasoning (or knowledge gradients) to distal (i.e., non-immediate) actions. Our remedy is
only partial, because the extent of actions for which metareasoning is to be leveraged should
be determined in advance. “Stateful” problems are typically referred to as planning problems,
which we explain next.
1.2.2 Approximate planning
Planning consists of finding an optimal sequence of external actions given an environment and
a goal. When formalized as a MDP, the goal is then to find an optimal or a near optimal policy.
However, achieving optimality is typically intractable; and one has to resort to approximately
optimal solutions. Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) is a popular family of methods for finding
such solutions. MCTS methods build a search tree of possible future states and actions by
using a model to simulate random trajectories. Good MCTS methods exploit nascent versions
of the tree to make judicious choices of what to simulate. One main computational advantage
of MCTS comes from the concept of sparse sampling [9]. It turns out that it suffices to build
a backup (expectimax) tree that is sparse, and as such, to avoid the curse of dimensionality
associated with building complete backup trees.
UCT [10], which we describe in detail later, is a popular MCTS method that performs very
well in many domains. Roughly speaking, UCT breaks down how simulations are chosen in
MCTS into smaller sub-problems, each of which is then treated as a bandit problem. UCT
is asymptotically optimal—meaning, given infinite computation time, finds the best action.
However, it is also known to be biased in the sense that it explores less than is optimal, when
the goal is to minimize simple regret as in MCTS [11].
This is because UCT treats MCTS—where the goal is to minimize the (simple) regret of
the action eventually taken—as a traditional bandit problem—where the goal is to minimize
the cumulative regret. To put it in another way, in MCTS, simulations are valuable, only be-
cause they help select the best action. However, UCT actually aims to maximize the sum of
rewards obtained in simulations, rather than paying attention to the quality of actual (i.e., not
simulated) actions. Consequently, it tries to avoid simulations with potentially low rewards,
even though they might help select better actions. In fact, Hay et. al. [4] improve the perfor-
mance of UCT just by adding a very limited metareasoning capability, namely by computing
an information value score for picking the immediate action from which to run a simulation,
and then resorting to vanilla UCT for the rest of the decisions down the tree. The practical part
of this thesis is concerned with pushing this envelope by building MCTS methods with better
metareasoning capabilities.
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1.3 Thesis organization
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce different notions of computation
values and provide formal definitions. In Chapter 3, we discuss how computation values can
be computed or approximated efficiently. In Chapter 4, we materialize our ideas into a Monte
Carlo tree search algorithm which leverages computation values. In Chapter 5, we evaluate
our methods, together with other popular methods, in two different environments, and show
that our computation-value-based algorithms perform either better than all other alternatives,
or comparably to the best alternative.
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Chapter 2
Value of Computation
“In truth, either reason is a mockery, or it must aim solely at our contentment, and
the sum of its labors must tend to make us live well and at our ease...”
– Michel de Montaigne, Essays
We begin by giving a general formal definition of computations and computation value.
Then, we introduce additional assumptions, and consider multi-armed bandit problems and
Markov decision processes.
2.1 Computations as higher-order functions
Let us leave MDPs and bandits aside for a moment, and consider a more abstract setting. Let S
be the set of possible states of the agent, A be the set of possible actions, and Q : S ×A → R
be the value function of the agent indicating the desirability of state-actions. Generally, we
consider an action desirable, if it is expected to lead to a valuable outcome.
Assume the agent has some control over Q—which can either result from obtaining better
knowledge of the possible outcomes of actions and their respective probabilities, or it can be
a more direct form of control, like deeming hard-to-reach-grapes as sour as in Aesop’s fable.
The latter corresponds to altering of utility functions1 (or primary reinforcers); and the former
of outcome probabilities, and thus of expected utilities (or secondary reinforcers) as well. We
refer to both kinds of alterations as computations, and to both utilities and expected utilities
as values for now. When we are discussing computation values in Markov decision processes
and multi-armed bandits, we will provide more concrete definitions, and limit the effect of
computations to expected utility alterations only.
In real time planning schemes such as Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS)—which we in-
troduce in a subsequent chapter—the agent aims to maximize the value2 of the best action,
maxa∈As Q(s, a), where As ⊆ A is the set of actions available at state s, by performing com-
putations. In general, we can think of a computation as a higher-order function transforming
the value function, ω : (S ×A → R)→ (S ×A → R). The value of the best action at state s
after performing the computation will be maxa∈As ω[Q](s, a), causing a net change of
max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)−max
a∈As
Q(s, a) . (2.1)
1Which assigns values to outcomes.
2In MCTS, there are true values (i.e., those given by the Bellman optimality equation) which are determined
by the environment. However, at the moment, we are considering a more abstract and general notion of values.
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This is the value of a deterministic computation whose outcome is known to the agent, which
the agent aims to maximize via,
arg max
ω∈Ω
[
max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)−max
a∈As
Q(s, a)
]
, (2.2)
where Ω is the set of possible computations.
Even though we would like to determine the optimizing computation so that we could
perform it, how to do it in an advantageous way is not clear. If one has to actually perform
all the computations in order to pick the best one, it is likely to be counterproductive from
a cost-benefit point of view as it would require paying the cost of |Ω| many computations in
return for performing a single computation.
However, if the agent has predictions concerning the effects of computations, possibly
obtained by storing the descriptive statistics of previous computations’ outcomes, this problem
can be circumvented. We operate under this assumption, and redefine ω as a random-valued
higher-order function that maps a value function to a random value function—as stochastic
computations include deterministic ones as a subset. Then, ω[Q](s, a) for a known a is a
random variable in R. This reflects the fact that the agent is not entirely sure about the effect
of a computation, and instead has a probability measure over the set of possible effects. Then,
we obtain the value of computation (VOC) for ω as
VOC(ω) = E[max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)]−max
a∈As
Q(s, a) . (2.3)
On the other hand, the commonly used definition [2, 4, 12] is slightly different, which we
denote with VOC′,
VOC′(ω) = E[max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)]− E[Q(arg max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a))] . (2.4)
Let us rewrite the VOC definition in Equation 2.3 to make it more compatible with Equa-
tion 2.4,
VOC(ω) = E[max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)]− E[Q(arg max
a∈As
Q(s, a))] (2.5)
= E[max
a∈As
ω[Q](s, a)]−Q(arg max
a∈As
Q(s, a)) . (2.6)
The difference is subtle. VOC′ uses the new expected value of the previously best action
as the baseline; whereas VOC uses the old value of the previously best action. Thus, VOC′
only takes the differences due to policy changes into account. Consider a case where there
are objective values to actions, meaning they are solely given by the environment such as in a
multi-armed bandit task, which we will formalize later on. In this case, computations cannot
directly modify the values (Q); however, they are useful because they can modify the agent’s
posterior expectations of Q, which in turn benefits the agent because he can make a better
decision concerning what action to take. VOC′ assumes this setting of objective Q’s and
therefore values a computation solely based on its impact on his policy at his current state, i.e.
pi(s, ·).
Lastly, it follows from the definition in Eq 2.4 that ∀ω : VOC′(ω) ≥ 0. However, we
cannot say much about VOC yet. For this, we need further assumptions, which we introduce
next.
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2.2 Computations as evidence
Up until now, we have assumed Q, the value function, is known to the agent. Here, we relax
this assumption, and treat it as a quantity that the agent estimates by performing computations.
Computations might achieve this in two distinct ways: by resolving empirical uncertainty or
computational uncertainty. The former uncertainty is due to insufficient external data. The
latter type is due to insufficient processing of the existing external data. Consider the problem
of estimating the parameters of a generative model from a dataset using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo. In order to get a more accurate estimate, one can either collect more data, or run more
Monte Carlo simulations. Alternatively, consider a tennis robot getting ready for a shot. He
would like to reduce his uncertainty about what the best motor commands are. He can achieve
this by collecting more data concerning the velocity and the position of the ball using his
sensors. Or, he can use the data he has, but spend processor cycles unrolling the physics model
he has into the future. In many cases, the total uncertainty is a combination of both empirical
and computational uncertainties. That being said, we focus on resolving uncertainties of this
latter kind—that is, computational—and thus consider planning in fully known environments.
However, the results we obtain should transfer to the cases where the agent also has to learn
the statistics of the environment (e.g., as in model-based learning).
Agents that operate in unknown environments typically collect statistics concerning the
outcomes of their actions in order to make better decision. We take this a step further, and
assume the agent also keeps statistics concerning his past computations and their outcomes.
Subsequently, we take a Bayesian approach and assume the value function, Q : S×A → R, is
sampled from a known distribution, which could be given by the past experience of the agent.
Note that, as before, we do not enforce the Bellman equation constraint yet, and treat the Q-
function in a more general sense—state-actions that have higher Q-values are more desirable.
The agent estimates this unknown Q-function by performing computations, which transform
Q, which is a random valued function, to another random valued function. Here, we change
our formalization of computations for one last time. A computation ω is no longer a higher-
order function, but is a function that outputs imperfects estimates of state-action values, which
we refer to as observations. At a given time, the agent will have performed a sequence of
computations ω1:t = ω1, ω2, . . . ωt whose respective outcomes are o1:t = o1, o2, . . . , ot. Each
computation belongs to a finite set Ω, and each outcome belongs to a potentially infinite set
O. Thus, ω1:t ∈ Ωt and o1:t ∈ Ot. For notational simplicity, we assume that the outcome of
a computation formally includes information about the computation from which the outcome
resulted. That is, if a computation ω yields information about anQ(s, a) ∈ R then the outcome
o of ω is in S×A×R—as it carries information about a state action, and its value3 . The agent
uses o1:t to get a better estimate ofQ, namely the posterior distribution p(Q|o1:t). We introduce
a random function Z, whose domain is S×A×Ot, such that p(Z(s, a|o1:t)) = p(Q(s, a)|o1:t)
for all state-actions, or equivalently Z(s, a|o1:t) = Q(s, a)|o1:t. In other words, Z-function is
the posterior distribution of the unknown Q-function conditioned on o1:t.
We would like to evaluate the value of a computation prior to performing the computation
itself. Therefore, we can think of a meta-computation, which evaluates the potential outcomes
of a computation ω. More specifically, we assume computations draw samples fromQ(s, a)+
where  is a stochastic noise term capturing the imperfection of computations; and thus, meta-
3More generally, a computation might carry information about multiple 〈s, a〉, then the outcome of the com-
putation would be in (S ×A× R)n.
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computations draw samples from Z(s, a|o1:t)+, which is the posterior predictive distribution.
An alternative formulation for meta-computations would be to draw samples directly from
Z(s, a|o1:t), without including the noise term . This, in a sense, captures how much one
can learn by performing sufficiently many computations such that the noise cancels out due
to the Law of Large Numbers, which is equivalent to the expected improvement formulation.
However, we would like to quantify how much we could learn from a single computation;
thus, the noise is included.
Previously, when computations were higher-order functions, we had denoted the expected
value of a function f , after a computation ω as E[ω[f ](·)]. Now, ω yields an observation o
about f , rather than transforming it. Therefore, we now denote the same value withEo∼ω[f(o)],
which captures the expected value of f after performing ω. The process of evaluating this ex-
pression is a meta-computation as it carries information about computation ω. In most settings
we will introduce, the cost of performing a meta-computation will be negligible compared to
the cost of performing a computation. As such, we only apply the cost-benefit analysis to the
computations themselves.
We assume there is a one-to-one mapping between actions and computations for a given
state. That is, between As, actions available at s, and Ωs, computations that directly affect
Q(s, ·), such that each ω ∈ Ωs corresponds to observing Q(s, a) for a specific a ∈ As and
vice versa. Therefore, from now on, performing a computation and sampling an action is used
interchangeably. This assumption is not necessary but convenient to introduce now as it is
both intuitive and common in planning algorithms. Consider the UCT algorithm [10] as an
example, for the computation called a roll-out, whose goal is to provide information about
the value of root actions. Note that, despite this one-to-one mapping between computations
and actions, a computation can have an effect on multiple state-action values given the po-
tential dependencies. The hypothetical outcome o ∼ ω of a candidate computation ω, affects
Z(s, a|o1:t) for all 〈s, a〉 and transforms it to Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o) where ⊕ is the concatenation
operator.
We avoid using the notation o¯t+1 for o1:t ⊕ o, because o1:t includes the outcomes of the
previously performed computations, whereas o is the hypothetical outcome of a candidate
computation, which has a different distribution (e.g., posterior predictive) than those compu-
tations in o1:t.
However, both past computations and future computations have the same type, i.e., they
belong to O. As such, they can form a sequence when concatenated. Note that, for a given o,
E[Z(·, ·|o1:t ⊕ o)] is a value in R|S|×|A| . However, for an unknown o, it is a random variable,
and Z(·, ·|o1:t ⊕ o) is a random function.
For all 〈s, a〉, we have
Eo∼ω [E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]] = E[Z(s, a|o1:t)] . (2.7)
due to the law of total expectation. This equality suggests that the beliefs of the agent
are coherent and cannot be exploited by a Dutch book. In our formulation, this is achieved
trivially, because we assume we know the prior distribution of Q. In the experiments section
we show that, even when we do not know the true sampling distribution of Q (i.e., when we
assume one), algorithms based on this principle can perform very well. Furthermore, we
postulate that humans do likely leverage some form informed priors, as we do here, which
can be satisfied by a TD-learning-like rule that learns the second moments of action values in
addition to the first ones.
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If we consider the maximum of action values under computations, given max is a convex
function, we have
Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]
]
≥ max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t)] , (2.8)
due to Jensen’s inequality. Most results in this chapter are derived directly from these two
relations. Equation 2.7 states that although the posterior distribution of Q may change after a
computation, its expectation remains the same. Despite this, the maximum posterior expecta-
tion is expected to increase or remain constant, as implied by Equation 2.8. In this setting, let
us reintroduce the value of computation definitions which we will use for the rest of the text:
Definition 1. We (re)define the value of computation,
VOC(ω; s, o1:t) = Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]
]
−max
a∈As
Eo∼ω[Z(s, a|o1:t)] , (2.9)
where o ∼ Z(s, a|o1:t) +  for some 〈s, a〉 and a noise term .
Definition 2. The alternative different formulation from Eq 2.4 is
VOC′(ω; s, o1:t) = Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]
−E
[
Z
(
s, arg max
a∈As
E [Z(s, a|o1:t)])|o1:t ⊕ o
)]]
. (2.10)
We will compare these two definitions through out this section. Recall that for now we
assume computations directly inform us about the actions available at the current state s. More
specifically, a computation draws samples from a specific action at s and is used to potentially
update value estimates of all state-actions. Then we have:
Proposition 1. If ω ∈ Ωs where s is the current state of the agent, then
VOC(ω; s, o1:t) = VOC′(ω; s, o1:t) . (2.11)
Proof. We need to show the second terms of Equations 2.9 and 2.10 are equal. Note that
max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t)] = E
[
Z
(
s, arg max
a∈As
E [Z(s, a|o1:t)])|o1:t
)]
(2.12)
by rearrangement. Then we can utilize the law of total expectation to assert,
E
[
Z
(
s, arg max
a∈As
E [Z(s, a|o1:t)])|o1:t
)]
= E
[
Z
(
s, arg max
a∈As
E [Z(s, a|o1:t)])|o1:t ⊕ o
)]
.
(2.13)
A policy decides which action to take given a state. We now introduce meta-policies,
which decide what computation to perform given a state and a sequence of past computation
outcomes. A more formal treatise of meta-policies and meta-MDPs can be found in [4].
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Definition 3. VOC-greedy and VOC′-greedy are meta-policies that perform the computa-
tion ω that maximizes VOC and VOC′ respectively until a fixed number of computations is
reached or until the VOC becomes non-positive for all computations. Having performed t
many computations whose outcomes are o1:t, if the agent takes an action, then he performs
arg maxa∈As E [Z(s, a|o1:t)]
Instead of performing a fixed number of computations, the agent might want to decide
whether the computation is worthwhile, and only if so, perform it. An intuitive and somewhat
[2, 4] popular stopping criterion is
max
ω∈Ω
VOC(ω; s, o1:t) < c , (2.14)
where c is the cost of performing a computation, typically in terms of time or energy.
We would like to evaluate the performance of meta-policies. The error function we are
interested minimizing is the so-called simple regret, because it captures the quality of the
eventually selected action.
Definition 4. Simple regret of a policy pi at state s is defined as
SR(s, pi) = Ea∼pi(s,·)
[
max
a′∈As
Q(s, a′)−Q(s, a)
]
, (2.15)
where pi(s, ·) is a curried function whose domain is A.
However, in the current setting, the Q-function is given by the environment and is un-
known. Therefore, at best, we can minimize our subjective estimate of simple regret, which
captures how much regret the agent expects to face if he is to take an action right away, which
we refer to as Bayesian simple regret. Formally:
Definition 5. We define the Bayesian simple regret (BSR) of a policy pi at state s given a
sequence of past computations o1:t as
BSR(s; pi, o1:t) = Ea∼pi(s,·)
[
E[max
a′∈As
Z(s, a′|o1:t)]− E[Z(s, a|o1:t)]
]
, (2.16)
where pi potentially takes o1:t into account.
It should be clear that the policy pi that minimizes BSR is a deterministic policy that
assigns probability 1 to the action arg maxa∈As E[Z(s, a|o1:t)]. Thus, we introduce the optimal
Bayesian simple regret (BSR∗) as
BSR∗(s; o1:t) = min
pi
BSR(s, pi; o1:t) (2.17)
= E[max
a∈As
Z(s, a|o1:t)]−max
a∈As
E[Z(s, a|o1:t)] . (2.18)
For a given policy pi, we would like to see the relation between BSR and SR. Recall that
Z(s, a|o1:t) = Q(s, a)|o1:t. Thus, BSR is in a sense the subjective expected simple regret:
BSR(s, pi; o1:t) = EQ∼Z|o1:t
Ea∼pi(s,·)
[
max
a′∈A
Q(s, a′)−Q(s, a)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=simple regret
 , (2.19)
where Z|o1:t = Z(·, ·|o1:t) is a random function.
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We can see that the agent can minimize the BSR at state s by taking better actions (i.e.,
controlling pi) or performing better computations (i.e., controlling o1:t). In reinforcement
learning, where model of the environment is not known, it might often be advantageous to
take actions that seem to be suboptimal—as the exploration induced by such actions might be
beneficial in the long-run. In planning problems, however, exploration of the state space is
not necessary nor beneficial as the model is already known. Therefore, the only reasonable
policy of selecting actions is to arg max the expected values obtained via the computations.
Consequently, the only way to (non-trivially) reduce BSR is to select better computations.
Definition 6. A meta-policy is said to be myopically optimal if and only if it performs a
computation ω∗ that minimizes the expected BSR∗ given the current state s and a sequence of
computation outcomes o1:t. That is,
ω∗ := arg min
ω∈Ω
Eo∼ω[BSR∗(s; o1:t ⊕ o)] . (2.20)
Proposition 2. VOC-greedy is myopically optimal.
Proof. The optimal computation as defined in Equation 2.20 remains unchanged if we subtract
the current BSR∗. I.e.,
ω∗ = arg min
ω∈Ω
Eo∼ω[BSR∗(s; o1:t ⊕ o)− BSR∗(s; o1:t)] . (2.21)
The first terms of the BSR∗’s are equal,
E[max
a∈As
Z(s, a|o1:t)] != Eo∼ωE[max
a∈As
Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)] (2.22)
, due to the law of total expectation. Hence we get,
ω∗ = arg min
ω∈Ω
Eo∼ω[max
a
E[Z(s, a|o1:t)]−max
a
E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]] (2.23)
= arg max
ω∈Ω
Eo∼ω[max
a
E[Z(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]−max
a
E[Z(s, a|o1:t)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=VOC(ω;s,o1:t)
(2.24)
Thus, VOC is the expected change in BSR∗; and a meta-policy that minimizes BSR∗ maxi-
mizes the value of computation.
Proposition 3. VOC′-greedy is myopically optimal.
Proof. This is a direct corollary of Propositions 1 and 2.
What about the asymptotic behavior as the agent performs infinitely many computations?
Proposition 4. If the sampling distributions are known, VOC-greedy is asymptotically op-
timal in the sense that simple regret approaches 0 in the limit of computations performed.
This is proved by Frazier et. al. [13] in the setting of knowledge gradient policies, results
of which directly apply here. Here, we give an intuitive but incomplete explanation why this
is the case.
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Proof sketch. There are two conditions in which VOC-greedy might fail to be asymptotically
optimal: (I) the meta-policy halts early, before ensuring simple regret is 0; (II) the meta-policy
does not halt, yet simple regret does not approach 0.
Note that BSR∗ equals zero if and only if there exists a policy whose simple regret is zero.
This is because SR is non-negative, and BSR∗ is the subjective expectation of SR under the
best policy.
Also recall that VOC of ω is the expected reduction in BSR∗ resulting from ω. Thus,
∃ω : VOC(ω; s, o1:t) > 0 =⇒ BSR∗(s; o1:t) > 0. The converse is also true for sampling
distributions with infinite support. Thus, the meta-policy does not halt until BSR∗ hence
the simple regret is 0. The condition (II) can only happen if an action is sampled finitely
many times, which cannot happen for probability distributions with infinite support, as there
will always be a chance of a sub-optimal action turning out to be the optimal one after a
computation.
In addition to myopic and asymptotic optimality, finite error bounds can also be computed
as done in [13].
Given our assumption about all the uncertainty being computational; posterior values be-
come delta functions given enough computation. If a similar approach is taken in a model-
based scenario, where the agent has to learn the statistics of the environment to make better
decisions, the Z-function would capture the value marginalized over empirical but not com-
putational uncertainties. Alternatively, the Z-function could account for both kinds of uncer-
tainties; however, this would bring added complexity—as regret cannot be made zero solely
via computations—and require a different formulation then we propose here.
We should point out that asymptotic optimality is easy to obtain. Heuristic policies such as
uniform random sampling, or -greedy also are asymptotically optimal as they sample all the
actions infinitely many times. However, VOC-greedy is the only policy that is both myopically
and asymptotically optimal4. What can we say about optimality for the cases in between these
two extremes? We have no optimality guarantees. In fact, computing the optimal meta-policy
that maximizes the cumulative computation value of B many computations is shown to be
NP-hard in B [14]. That being said, optimality in two extremes suggests that the performance
is likely good in between as well?but likely not optimal. Therefore, myopic and asymptotic
optimality is the best we can obtain efficiently in general.
In this section, we were only concerned with computations and actions regarding the state
s occupied by the agent. We assumed the sampling distribution of Q(s, ·) is a given—which
could be unrealistic in multi-state settings (MDPs) as computing the sampling distribution
might require actually solving the problem. We address this problem in Section 2.4. Before
that, we direct our attention to an easier problem, namely the multi-armed bandit problem.
2.3 Computations in multi-armed bandits
In this section, we consider a more concrete setting, and motivate the usefulness of VOC in
multi-armed bandits, or equivalently, in discrete Bayesian optimization. Here, we will focus
on selecting the optimal action to perform, rather than the optimal computation. We show that
the formalism behind the two are analogous and our VOC results are directly applicable here.
Consequently, we do not introduce any new ideas here and readers who are not interested
4Besides the n = 1 case, where VOC-greedy and VOC′-greedy are equivalent
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in a concrete example are encouraged to skip this section. We should also mention that this
problem has been studied in the setting of the knowledge gradients and similar results can be
found in [13]. Below, we (re)introduce the multi-armed bandit problem we have discussed in
Introduction before.
Definition 7. In a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, there is a finite set of actionsA, and
a value function Q : A → R, which is unknown to the agent. At each time step t, the agent
takes an action at ∈ A and collects rt = Q(at)+ where  is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution
with zero mean and potentially depends on at. The goal is to minimize a measure concerning
the expected simple regret—which is defined as R(t) = Eat [maxa∈AQ(a)−Q(at)]. One can
either aim to minimize this directly for some t, or its time sum, that is
∑n
i=1 R(i) for some n.
Example 1. Consider the setting of a MAB problem, where  ∼ N (0, 1/τ) i.i.d. for a known
τ and Q(a) ∼ N (µ0, 1/τ0) i.i.d. for known µ0 and τ0. Let r1:t = r1, r2, . . . , rt be a sequence
of returns yielded by sampling a specific action a and rˆt = 1t
∑t
i=1 ri. Thus, at time step t, if
the agent takes action a and receives reward rt ∈ R, then we define the observation resulting
from this action as ot = 〈rt, a〉. Then, the posterior is obtained by
Z(a|o1:t) ∼ N
(
tτ rˆt + τ0µ0
tτ + τ0
,
1
tτ + τ0
)
. (2.25)
where N is the normal distribution. Then, the posterior predictive distribution of a return
sampled form a is Z(a|o1:t) + . We can see that the formulation for picking actions based on
observations is equivalent picking computations as we have done previously. Let us consider
whether equality asserted by the law of total expectation holds as in Equation 2.7,
Eo∼ωa [E[Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)]] ?= E[Z(a|o1:t)] , (2.26)
where o is what the agent supposes to observe after performing action a. We use the notation
o ∼ ωa instead of o ∼ a in order to keep the notation consistent with our VOC formulation.
We have
Eo∼ωa [Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)] ∼ N
(
(t+ 1)τ rˆt+1 + τ0µ0
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
,
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
(2.27)
= N
(
τ(nrˆt + rt+1) + τ0µ0
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
,
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
. (2.28)
Given rt+1 is sampled from the posterior predictive, Z(a|o1:t) +N (0, 1/τ), we can include its
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mean and variance,
Eo∼ωa [Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)] ∼ N
(
τtrˆt + τ0µ0
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
τ
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
tτ rˆt + τ0µ0
tτ + τ0
, (2.29)
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
(
τ
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)2(
1
tτ + τ0
+
1
τ
))
(2.30)
= N
(
(τtrˆt + τ0µ0)
(
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
τ/(tτ + τ0)
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
, (2.31)
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
(
τ
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)2(
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
τ(tτ + τ0)
))
(2.32)
= N
(
(τtrˆt + τ0µ0)
(
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
τ/(tτ + τ0)
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
, (2.33)
1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
+
τ/(tτ + τ0)
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
(2.34)
= N
(
tτ rˆt + τ0µ0
tτ + τ0
,
1
tτ + τ0
)
, (2.35)
which is the same distribution with that of Z(a|o1:t) as given in Eq 2.25. Then,
Z(a|o1:t) d= Eo∼ωa [Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)] , (2.36)
where d= denotes a distributional equality, which in turn implies
E[Z(a|o1:t)] = Eo∼ωa [E[Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)]] . (2.37)
Thus the equality in Equation 2.26 holds and the probability estimates are consistent. Further-
more, we can also see that
VOC(ωa; o1:t) := Eo∼ωa
[
max
a∈A
E[Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)]
]
−max
a∈A
E[Z(a|o1:t)] ≥ 0 , (2.38)
due to Jensen’s inequality. Note that, in this bandit settings, we do not perform computations
but actions. We are evaluating the information obtained by performing a, which is usually
referred to as the value of information. However, because the underlying formulations are the
same, we stick to VOC.
Let us consider the first term in Equation 2.38. When considering the value of t + 1th
action, given t many observations, we have
E[Z(a|o1:t ⊕ o)] ∼ N
(
E[Z(a|o1:t)], 1
tτ + τ0
− 1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
)
. (2.39)
In a sense, computations add variability to the expectations of Z’s—which is good, as higher
variability under convexity (i.e., max in our case) mean higher expectation. This might seem
puzzling, as we would like to reduce the uncertainty by performing computations, which is
actually the case as we have
Var [Z(a|o1:t+1)]] = 1
(t+ 1)τ + τ0
≤ Var [Z(a|o1:t)] = 1
tτ + τ0
. (2.40)
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In other words, computations reduce the total variance by shifting a fraction of the variance
into the expectation, which subsequently is resolved by performing a computation.
Lastly, in this example, whereQ(a) are sampled independently across a, then VOC can be
calculated analytically, as it will be the expectation of a truncated normal distribution. In the
case of correlated Q(a) samples with a known covariance, the analytical solution still exists
[6, 13]; however, the involved computations are more costly.
If the sampling distributions are not known, then BSR will not be equivalent to expected
simple regret. VOC-greedy will still be myopically optimal with respect to the assumed dis-
tribution of Q by construction. However, it won’t be guaranteed to minimize the expected
simple regret as it is a function of the true Q, which has an unknown distribution. In terms of
asymptotic optimality, the prior needs ensure that each arm will be sampled infinitely many
times, which is sufficient but not necessary.
2.4 Computations in Markov decision processes
We saw VOC-greedy (and also VOC′-greedy) are myopically and asymptotically optimal in
minimizing Bayesian simple regret in multi-armed bandits. Eventually we would like to see if
this transfers to MDPs. Assume we treat the actions at the current state s as bandit arms. Can
we apply the principles from the previous section to solve this bandit problem?
The main obstacle is that in MDPs, action values are not solely given by the environment,
but are a product of both the environment and the agent’s policy. To complicate the matters
further, the policy of the agent likely improves as he performs more computations; thus, the
action values should ideally reflect the knowledge of his future self. To circumvent this prob-
lem, we introduce static and dynamic values, which respectively capture how much the agent
should value an action if he can no longer perform any computations or if he can perform
infinitely many computation in the future.
Before moving on, let us consider a puzzle which will yield insights into static and dynamic
values. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there are two rooms: the first room contains two boxes,
and the second one contains five boxes. Each box contains an unknown amount of money.
First you need choose a room, then you can select any of the boxes in the room—but peeking
inside is not allowed—and collect the money. Which room should you choose? What if you
could peek inside the boxes upon choosing the room?
In the first case, it doesn’t matter which room one chooses, as all the boxes are equally
valuable in expectation, as no further information is given. Whereas, in the second case,
choosing the second room, the one with five boxes, is the better option. This is because
one can obtain further information by peeking inside the boxes—and more boxes mean more
money in expectation, as one has the option to choose the best one. Formally, let X = {xi}nxi=1
and Y = {yi}nyi=1 be the sets of boxes of the first and the second room respectively. Assume all
the boxes are sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution and nx < ny. Then, if one cannot
peek inside the boxes, we have the equality of two rooms, as maxx∈X E[x] = maxy∈Y E[y].
Whereas, is one can peek inside all the boxes, then the Y -room is more valuable in expectation
as E[maxx∈X x] = E[maxy∈Y y]. Therefore, it is smarter to pick the room with more boxes, if
peeking is allowed.
Alternatively, what if one can only reveal the contents of three boxes, which needs to be
done before committing to a room? Or what if one gets to reveal one box before selecting a
room, and reveal another one after selecting the room?
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Figure 2.1: Graphical illustration of the puzzle. There are two rooms, one containing two
boxes, another one containing five boxes. There is an unknown amount of money in each box.
In this chapter, we address these questions in a principled way, through static and dynamic
values. In the next chapters, we show that the answers we provide are directly applicable to
MCTS—where one has imperfect information about action values, and gets to “reveal” more
information by performing rollouts.
Using these, we redefine computation values for MDPs. It turns out that VOC-greedy
is still myopically and asymptotically optimal, whereas this is no longer the case for VOC′-
greedy.
Before moving on to MDPs from MABs, we introduce an intermediate problem, where
the idea is to “cut out” a “reduced-MDP” by uniformly expanding in all directions from the
current state for a fixed number of steps5 (i.e., actions). To this end, we introduce new value
function measures that we use to relate the action values that lie on the “cut” to the current
state of the agent.
Definition 8. Values of state-action pairs can be defined recursively6, which we refer to as the
n-step value, and obtain as
Qpin(s, a) =
{
Qpi0 (s, a) if n = 0∑
s′ Pass′
[
Rass′ + γ
∑
a′∈As′ pi(s
′, a′)Qpin−1(s
′, a′)
]
else
, (2.41)
where Q0 : S ×A → R is a measure of how valuable frontier state-actions are.
We will consider different assumptions concerning Q0. They can belong to the environ-
ment as in the expected rewards of bandit arms. Alternatively, the spatial horizon of n can
be computational. Meaning, even though there are reachable steps beyond n, the agent ig-
nores them and treats the expected rewards of the frontier actions as bandit arms. In either
case, we assume that they are independent of agent’s policy. Justification of this assumption
is two-fold. First, the impact of the policy on action values diminishes as we go farther away
from the current state. Second, as we discuss later, we could implicitly account for the policy
at remote states by leveraging an adaptive sampling policy such as the UCT-policy for Monte
Carlo tree search.
5The expansion does not have to be uniform, but we consider this scenario for simplicity.
6As in the Bellman policy evaluation equation.
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In practice, if we have a spatial horizon of n, we will compute Qpin for the actions that are
available at the current state, and Qpin−1 for the actions that are 1-step reachable, and so on,
until we get to the state-actions that lie on the cut, for which we will have Q0.
The n-step value is convenient because it provides a trade-off between a MAB problem and
a full-fledged MDP. Let n = 0, and Q0(s, a) be drawn from a known sampling distribution.
The agent does not know Q0(s, a), but can draw noisy samples from it. Then the problem
of finding the best computation to maximize the root action value here is equivalent to the
problem of finding the best action to perform in a MAB problem, where the goal is to minimize
the expected simple regret of the next time step. For n > 0, the n-step value generalizes this
MAB problem to multiple states. Also for n→∞, we essentially get the full Bellman backups
that solves an MDP.
Note that, even if the estimates ofQ0 are highly unreliable, the estimates of proximal state-
actions (e.g., of high n) will be more reliable given the γ that shrinks the errors by γn and
∑
operations which “average out” the noise of the frontier estimates. We now reintroduce n-step
optimal value function, leaving pi out of the equation:
Definition 9. We define the n-step optimal value function as
Q∗n(s, a) =
{
Q0(s, a) if n = 0∑
s′ Pass′
[Rass′ + γmaxa′∈As′ Q∗n−1(s′, a′)] else , (2.42)
where Q0 : S ×A → R is a measure of how valuable frontier state-actions are.
The motivation for this comes from the fact that, the structure of a Monte Carlo Search
Tree resembles that of an n-step optimal value equation. The leaves of the tree offer imperfect
estimates of action values, which are propagated to the root of the tree in order to rank and
select the best action available at the root. One difference is that MCTS algorithms build
trees iteratively, whereas we assume full-expansion up to depth n. In fact, as a result of this
expansion, we end up with a weighted directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the current state
is the sink, and all n-step reachable nodes are sources. Thus, our data structure is not a tree
as in MCTS, but it is a graph, which we refer to as a search graph. The crucial difference
is that, in a tree, each node can have a single parent; whereas in a DAG, a node can have
multiple parents. Therefore, a DAG is more (sample-wise) efficient than a tree for evaluating
action values, as the latter does not share the information across branches [15]. Consequently,
instead of a root node as in MCTS, we have a sink, which is the state of the agent; and instead
of leaves, we have sources. Values, or uncertainties, flow from sources to the sink in a sense.
If a state-action pair is far from the sink, we refer to it as being distal; and if it is close, as
being proximal.
From now on, we assume we are given a search graph, and we would like to perform
computations, which are the noisy estimates of source values, in order to minimize the BSR∗
at the sink. As before, our action value estimates are probabilistic and are denoted by Z, such
that Z(s, a|o1:t) = Q0(s, a)|o1:t.
Definition 10. Given that we are now uncertain about the action values, we define the dy-
namic value function as ψn(s, a|o1:t) := EZ|o1:t [Υn(s, a|o1:t)] where,
Υn(s, a|o1:t) :=
{
Z(s, a|o1:t) if n = 0∑
s′ Pass′
[Rass′ + γmaxa′∈As′ Υn−1(s′, a′|o1:t)] else . (2.43)
ψn(s, a) captures how valuable 〈s, a〉 is, assuming the agent will have obtained all the infor-
mation needed to completely eliminate his uncertainties about the frontier action values. The
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‘dynamic’ reflects the fact that the agent will likely change his mind about the best actions
available at each states in the future; yet, this is reflected and accounted for in ψn.
This value is useful, because imagine you are forced to take an action right away, after
which you will have the luxury of deliberation. In this case, the value of your action should
take into account that the future version of you will be wiser, which ψn achieves. The major
downside is that it cannot be computed efficiently in general. However, in the algorithms
section, we will introduce an efficient way of computing ψn approximately. Alternatively, we
can utilize another measure, which captures the other extreme, where the agent cannot obtain
any new information.
Definition 11. We define the static value function as
φn(s, a|o1:t) :=
{
E [Z(s, a|o1:t)] if n = 0∑
s′ Pass′
[Rass′ + γmaxa′∈As′ φn−1(s′, a′|o1:t)] else . (2.44)
φn(s, a) captures how valuable 〈s, a〉 would be if the agent were to take n actions before
running any new computations. We also refer to n as the spatial horizon.
In Figure 2.2, we graphically contrast dynamic and static values, where the difference is
the stage at which the expectation is taken. For the former, it is done at the level of the root
actions; for the latter, at the level of the leaves.
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Figure 2.2: Graphical illustration dynamic and static values. We ignore immediate rewards and
the discounting for simplicity, and consider 2-step values. In Panel A, dynamic values (given
by ψ) are obtained by calculating the expected maximum of all state-action values (given by
Z) lying 2-steps away. Whereas, the static values (given by φ) are obtained by calculating the
maximum of expectations of state-action values, as shown in Panel B.
Note that ψn(s, a|o1:t) is a convex function of Z(·, ·|o1:t) evaluated at the frontier nodes.
Thus, let us denote ψn(s, a|o1:t) as f(Z) where f is a convex functional. Then we have
φn(s, a|o1:t) = f(EZ). Consequently, by Jensen’s inequality, we get
ψn(s, a|o1:t) ≥ φn(s, a|o1:t) . (2.45)
This shows that, regardless of the computation outcomes, i.e. o1:t, the dynamic value is at
least as big as the static value, which is intuitive.
In addition, ψn accounts for what we refer to as optionality, namely the fact that given the
agent might gather more information in the future, he should value the option to change his
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mind (and his policy). Flexible flight tickets—where one can change the dates without paying
a penalty—are more expensive because of the optionality. By buying a flexible ticket to Sicily,
you are paying for the option to postpone your trip for a few days if your holiday turns out to
be in risk of being ruined by bad weather.
So far we have only examined properties of ψn and φn statically—given past computation
outcomes o1:t. Now, the effects of we consider future computations, for which we need to
consider two cases: (I) the sampling distributions of Q0(s, a) and  are known and stationary;
and (II) unknown and non-stationary.
Known sampling distributions
Let us consider the case where the sampling distribution of Q0, as well as that of the noise, is
known, but Q0 itself is unknown. We can think of this case as an MDP, where all state-action
pairs n-step away from the current state are stationary bandits, and we would like to sample
the bandit arms in order to determine the values of actions, which then would be propagated
back to the state occupied by the agent. In other words, all the reducible uncertainty7 concerns
the values of the frontier actions. Therefore, the agent attempts gain certainty about those
actions in an effort to improve his decision quality at his current state.
In this setting, Z(s, a) is the known sampling distribution of Q0(s, a), hence the prior; and
Z(s, a|o1:t) is the posterior distribution conditioned by a sequence of computation outcomes
o1:t. Then we have,
EQ0∼Z [Q∗n(s, a)] = ψn(s, a|〈〉) , (2.46)
where 〈〉 is a null computation sequence, i.e., with no elements. Furthermore, dynamic
values are stable in expectation under any sequence of future computations ω1:k, which would
add k more computation outcomes to the outcomes existing in o1:t. At this point, a compu-
tation consists of drawing a sample as well as computing the updated ψn and φn given the
sample.
We can see that ψn is consistent with respect to the new computations—meaning it is
constant in expectation,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) = Eo1:k∼ω1:k [ψn(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o1:k)] , (2.47)
due to the law of total expectation. Note that the k new computations can be applied in bulk
without updating ψn after every computation. Or ψn can be updated after every computation,
such that each computation would be based on the updated Z resulting from the previous com-
putations. Eq 2.47 holds for either approaches. We can also relate it to the agent’s expectation
of Q∗n,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) = EQ0∼Z|o1:t [Q∗n(s, a)] . (2.48)
For φn, we can assert that
Eo1:k∼ω1:k [φn(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o1:k)] ≥ φn(s, a|o1:t) , (2.49)
which follows from Jensen’s inequality. This suggests that the static values cannot decrease in
expectation after a computation sequence; yet, they are not consistent as ψn are. Combining
these we get,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) ≥ Eo1:k∼ω1:k [φn(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o1:k)] ≥ φn(s, a|o1:t) . (2.50)
7In contrast to the irreducible uncertainty, which is given by the environment, for instance, in terms of the
stochasticity of state transitions.
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In fact,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) = lim
k→∞
Eo1:k∼ω1:k [φn(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o1:k)] , (2.51)
assuming a reasonable8 meta-policy.
In other words, the value an agent hopes to reap from an environment by taking an action—
given he will have performed more computations in the future before taking the action—falls
between the static and dynamic values. Therefore, we think these values form reasonable
bases for computing computation values, as they are independent of the policy as well as the
future policies.
Bayesian simple regret and the value of computation in MDPs
We define Bayesian simple regret for MDPs, as we did for MABs, using the new mea-
sures we introduced. Recall Υn(s, a|o1:t) we introduced in Equation 2.43, which is a ran-
dom variable representing the uncertainty of state-action values. Note that ψn(s, a|o1:t) :=
EZ|o1:t [Υn(s, a|o1:t)], thus EZ|o1:t [maxa∈As Υn(s, a|o1:t)] ≥ maxa∈As ψn(s, a|o1:t) by Jensen’s
inequality. The left-hand-side of the inequality captures the value of s, if the agent could ob-
tain perfect information; whereas the right-hand-side captures the value of the best action if
the agent could completely resolve his uncertainty after taking the action. As such, we use Υ
to formalize Bayesian simple regret. For a set of past computation outcomes o1:t, the BSR∗ at
state s is
BSR∗(s; f, o1:t) = E
[
max
a∈As
Υn(s, a|o1:t)
]
−max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t) , (2.52)
for f is a real-valued function that values state-action pairs given past information, in our case
f ∈ {φn, ψn}. Note that this definition is slightly different that the BSR∗ we have defined in
Equation 2.18 as we are now basing it on the static and dynamic values.
Similarly, we can adapt the definitions of VOC and VOC′ we have given before to MDPs
simply by replacing Z(s, a|o1:t) with φn(s, a|o1:t) or ψn(s, a|o1:t),
VOC(ω; f, o1:t, s) = Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)−max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)
]
(2.53)
VOC′(ω; f, o1:t, s) = Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)− f(s, arg max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
,
(2.54)
where f ∈ {φn, ψn} as well.
We introduce the algorithms VOC(φn)-greedy, VOC(ψn)-greedy (same for VOC′) which
perform the computation that maximizes the specified VOC measure. If the computation
budget is small, then selecting actions and computations w.r.t. φn should give better results,
as it will be a better estimate of expected Q∗n conditioned on past and future computations.
Whereas, if the budget is large, then we should value the uncertainties more, since the agent
presumably will be able to gain additional value by resolving those uncertainties. Hence, ψn
should be a better measure.
8More precisely, an asymptotically optimal one, which is easy to realize.
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Proposition 5. VOC(φn)-greedy and VOC(ψn)-greedy are still myopically optimal by con-
struction in the sense that they maximize the expected decrease in BSR∗(s;φn, o1:t) and
BSR∗(s;ψn, o1:t) respectively.
Proof. As we have shown before in a similar setting,
ω∗ := arg min
ω
Eo∼ω[BSR∗(s; f, o1:t ⊕ o)] (2.55)
= arg min
ω
Eo∼ω[BSR∗(s; f, o1:t ⊕ o)]− BSR∗(s; f, o1:t) (2.56)
= arg max
ω
[
−Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
+ max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)
]
, (2.57)
given EZ|o1:t [maxa∈As Υn(s, a|o1:t)] = Eo∼ωEZ|o1:t [maxa∈As Υn(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)]. Thus,
ω∗ = arg max
ω
VOC(ω; f, o1:t, s) . (2.58)
That is, selecting the computation that maximizes VOC minimizes the expected BSR∗, or
more strongly, VOC of a computation is the expected decrease in the optimal Bayesian simple
regret.
Then what can we say about VOC′? Let us see if and when VOC and VOC′ are equal.
For this, the second terms in Equations 2.53 and 2.54 need to be equal. That is,
Eo∼ω
[
f(s, arg max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
!
= max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t) (2.59)
= f(s, arg max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t) . (2.60)
This can only hold if the law of total expectation can be induced. If f = ψn, then we have
Eo∼ω
[
ψn(s, arg max
a∈As
ψn(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
= EZ|o1:t
[
Υn(s, arg max
a∈As
ψn(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
(2.61)
= EZ|o1:t
[
Υn(s, arg max
a∈As
ψn(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t)
]
(2.62)
= ψn(s, arg max
a∈As
f(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t) . (2.63)
However, this does not hold for f = φn because the expectation of φn is not constant under
computations as shown in Equation 2.49. Thus we have,
VOC(ω;ψn, o1:t, s) = VOC′(ω;ψn, o1:t, s) (2.64)
VOC(ω;φn, o1:t, s) ≥ VOC′(ω;φn, o1:t, s) . (2.65)
Subsequently, we can make the following claims.
Proposition 6. VOC′(φn)-greedy may not be myopically optimal.
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Proof sketch. We have shown that VOC(φ)-greedy is optimal. Computations selected by
VOC′(φn)-greedy diverges from those selected by VOC(φ)-greedy given Equation 2.65 and
as such is not optimal in general.
Proposition 7. VOC(φn)-greedy is asymptotically optimal, but VOC′(φn)-greedy may not
be.
Proof. Optimality of VOC(φn)-greedy is due to the same conditions that make VOC-greedy
optimal in MAB-like settings, as given by Proposition 4. We can show by counterexample
that VOC′(φn)-greedy may stop too early. Consider an agent in state S of a deterministic
MDP, with no immediate rewards and γ = 1. It forms a search graph by uniformly expanding
actions for 2 steps. The black dots are the frontier nodes, values of which the agent estimates
by drawing samples. Consider at time step t of planning, the posterior distributions are as
described in Figure 2.3.
E[Q0(X,L)|o¯t]
∼ N (0, 1)
E[Q0(X,R)|o¯t]
∼ N (0, 1)
E[Q0(Y,R)|o¯t] = −1
X Y
L
L R
R R
S
Figure 2.3: A search graph, where VOC′(φn)-greedy stops early.
AssumeZ(X, L|o1:t) := E[Q0(X, L)|o1:t] is orthogonal toZ(X,R|o1:t) := E[Q0(X,R)|o1:t].
Note that, φ2(S, L) = maxa∈{L,R} E[Z(X, a)] = 0 whereas φ2(S,R) = −1. Recall that
VOC′ > 0 iff the agent can change its mind about what the best action is. Current best action
at S is L. However, sampling 〈X, L〉 or 〈X,R〉 once cannot affect the best action at S. That
would require sampling both 〈X, L〉 and 〈X,R〉. Therefore, the VOC′(φn)-greedy will stop
early unlike VOC(φn)-greedy. This can be interpreted as VOC′(φn)-greedy being lazy as it
defers sampling until the point that it is useful. However, this laziness is costly because it may
result in choosing suboptimal actions. In this example, the agent will not perform any com-
putations and instead take the action L that will take him to X. However, there is a non-zero
probability that R is the better action. Therefore, by taking action L, the agent concedes an
expected value loss.
Proposition 8. VOC(ψn)-greedy and VOC′(ψn)-greedy are both myopically and asymptoti-
cally optimal.
Proof sketch. In Proposition 5, we established the myopic optimality of VOC(ψn)-greedy. It
is also asymptotically optimal due to the same conditions before—all frontier actions will be
sampled infinitely many times. Both VOC(ψn)-greedy and VOC′(ψn)-greedy select the same
computations. As such, both are myopically and asymptotically optimal.
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Unknown sampling distributions
Let us briefly consider a more realistic case, where the sampling distributions are unknown.
Consider the MCTS algorithms proposed in [4, 12], where the agent treats the root state as
a MAB problem such that pulling an arm is equivalent to sampling a roll-out directly from
that action 9. If the rollout policy is fixed, then the returns of the rollout will be sampled
from a stationary but unknown distribution. In this case, using the VOC-greedy with weak
priors should work well in practice, for which we also provide evidence in the experiments
section. On the other hand, consider the case where the sampling procedure is adaptive. For
example, when sampling an arm is equivalent to using UCT—which is an adaptive policy—as
a subroutine. Then the expectation of the sampling distribution shifts from the action values
of the rollout policy10, to Q∗. Note that, with each rollout, we would expect the expectation
of rollout returns to increase in expectation, even though they might decrease. In this case,
if a weak prior that assumes a stationary sampling distribution is used, φn can be used to
lower bound the expectation of Q∗ given the observations. However, because of the upward
drift in Q, upper bounding via ψn has no theoretical guarantees. Possible practical solutions
include using a sliding temporal window and taking the last N observations into account and
exponentially discounting the past experiences, both of which are utilized in the context of
multi-armed bandit algorithms [16, 17] for estimating the empirical mean returns. However,
using the same methods in a Bayesian settings requires more care.
More generally, we know that as n → ∞, Q∗n and thus φn will approach Q∗ for any n—
assuming sampling is done by an asymptotically optimal policy such as UCT. We can also
assert that as t→∞, φn will approach Q∗. This is because all frontier nodes will be sampled
infinitely many times, and if they are sampled with UCT, then their values will converge to
Q∗, and thus, the proximal nodes will converge as well. Furthermore, existence of finite
sample error bounds for knowledge gradients [13] suggests that similar analysis can be done
for VOC(φn) and VOC(ψn)-greedy policies, but this remains as a potential further work.
In the experiments section, we will provide empirical evidence suggesting that VOC-greedy
performs well even when the sampling distributions are non-stationary and unknown.
2.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced the value of computation (VOC), and argued that maximizing
it results in myopically and asymptotically optimal policies. More importantly, we provided
a method to calculate VOC’s in Markov decision processes that circumvents the problem of
state-action values depending on the future policy of the agent, which is unknown during
the planning process. Our method operates on a MDP-like structure that is smaller than the
original MDP. This yields desirable properties; however, is computationally costly and is not
realistic from a neuroscientific or cognitive point of view.
9This assumption is violated if the sampling is done via an adaptive process such as UCT, which is what the
authors use to sample the “arms”.
10Typically uniform random.
25
26
Chapter 3
Computing the Value of Computation
“The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth
down the mind that museth upon many things.”
– Unknown Author, Wisdom of Solomon
In the previous section, we proposed the VOC(φn)-greedy and VOC(ψn)-greedy algo-
rithms by providing what they compute without addressing how. The latter is the topic of this
section.
We first consider the case where state transitions are deterministic for all state-action pairs.
We then generalize the formulation to the general, stochastic case. While describing these
algorithms, we will appeal to an abstract notion of computation as an operation that provides
information about action values. The detailed realization of the computations is left to the next
chapter, which uses the framework of Monte Carlo tree search methods.
3.1 Deterministic state transitions
If the state transitions are deterministic, then we can further simplify the n-step optimal values
defined in Eq 2.42 by eliminating the expectations over state transitions (i.e., Pass′). Then, the
recursively defined optimal values, together with static and dynamic values, can be collapsed
into a single max, which is over the source nodes, and a single E which is over the scaled and
shifted Z-values of the frontier nodes. The scaling is due to the discounting by γd, where d
is the depth of the corresponding frontier node; and shifting is due to the expected discounted
immediate rewards along the path from the sink to the frontier node. Therefore, it is convenient
to introduce a new function, Y , which is the shifted and scaled Z. Then, we can rewrite the
optimal value equation for a root state action 〈s, a〉 as,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) = E
[
max
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
Y (s′, a′|o1:t)
]
(3.1)
φn(s, a|o1:t) = max〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachableE [Y (s
′, a′|o1:t)] , (3.2)
where Y (s′, a′|o1:t) := r0 + γr1 + γ2r2 + · · ·+ γdZ(s′, a′|o1:t), where ri denote the expected
immediate reward of depth i that lies between the sink node and the given source (i.e., 〈s, a〉
here). We illustrate the relationship between Z and Y graphically in Figure 3.1.
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r0 + γr1 + γ
2Z(s′, a′|o1:t)→ Y (s′, a′|o1:t)
s′ a
′
Figure 3.1: Y is composed of discounted combinations of immediate rewards, and the Z-
function evaluated at the frontier node.
It is easy to evaluate φn, as it requires finding the maximum of expected Y values. Whereas,
ψn requires finding the expected maximum of Y ’s, as such, is harder. Even in the case of Y ’s
distributed i.i.d. according to a Normal distribution, we have no exact closed form solution.
Therefore, ψn needs to be computed approximately, for instance, by resorting to Monte Carlo
sampling or variational methods. In the following subsection, we put forward an alternative
method not only for approximating ψn, but also for approximating VOC(ψn) efficiently.
3.1.1 Approximating ψn
We utilize a bound by Lai and Robbins [18] enable us to get a handle on ψn. This asserts,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) = E
[
max
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
Y (s′, a′|o1:t)
]
(3.3)
≤ c+
∑
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
∫ ∞
c
[
1− F s′a′(x)
]
dx
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
sa
o1:t
(3.4)
where F s′a′ . This bound does not assume independence and holds for any correlation structure
by assuming the worst case.
Equation 3.4 is true for all c. However, the tightest bound is obtained by differentiating the
right side with respect to c, and setting it’s derivative to zero, which in turn yields∑
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
[
1− F s′a′(c)
]
= 1 .
Thus, the optimizing c can be obtained via line search methods. If Y (s′, a′|o1:t) are distributed
according to a Normal distribution, then we can eliminate the integral ,
λsao1:t = c+
∑
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
[
(σs
′a′)2F s
′a′(c) + (µs
′a′ − c)
[
1− F s′a′(c)
]]
. (3.5)
3.1.2 Upper Expectation Bound (UEB) Algorithm
We now introduce our first algorithm, which leverages the upper bound given by λsao1:t for
computing VOC(ψn). This can be naively done by leveraging the bounds we obtained for
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quantifying the value of a computation by
VOC(ω;ψn, o1:t, s) ≈ Eo∼ω[max
a∈As
λsao1:t⊕o]−maxa∈As λ
sa
o1:t
. (3.6)
However, this is a very costly evaluation—even in the case of Normally distributed frontier
node values — because of the expectation. Instead, we can make the following approximation
to reduce the burden by treating the time as a continuous variable momentarily,
λsao1:t⊕o ≈ λsao1:t + η
dλsao1:t
dt
, (3.7)
for some η ∈ R. As we will see later, the exact value of η will be insignificant. Then, we can
now look at how a λsao1:t (and thus maxa λ
sa
o1:t
) is expected to change locally with respect to t,
by evaluating dλsao1:t/dt.
Assume Y (s, a|o1:t) ∼ N
(
µs
′a′
o1:t
, (σs
′a′
o1:t
)2
)
; that is, µsao1:t and (σ
sa
o1:t
)2 are the posterior mean
and the variance respectively. Then, we have
dλsao1:t
dt
=
∑
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
[
∂λsao1:t
∂σs′a′o1:t
dσs
′a′
o1:t
dt
+
∂λsao1:t
∂µs′a′o1:t
dµs
′a′
o1:t
dt
]
. (3.8)
At this point, we could assume an independent conjugate Normal prior over Q∗(s, a) as
in Example 1. Then, a computation would only affect a single frontier node. That is, in this
independent case all dµsao1:t/dt and dσ
sa
o1:t
/dt will be zero besides the one that is being sampled.
Therefore, instead of taking derivatives with respect to t, we take with respect to ns′a′ which
is the number of times 〈s′, a′〉 is sampled, thus ns′a′ ≤ t. Then, as we have done in Example 1
posterior means and variances can be obtained as,
µs
′a′
o1:t
=
ns
′a′τ rˆs
′a′
t + τ0µ0
ns′a′τ + τ0
, (3.9)
σs
′a′
o1:t
= 1/τ s
′a′
o1:t
= ns
′a′τ + τ0 , (3.10)
where rˆs′a′t =
1
ns′a′
∑ns′a′
i=1 r
s′a′
i is the mean of the sampled obtained from 〈s′, a′〉, µ0 and τ0
are the prior mean and precision, and τ is the sample precision. Subsequently, we obtain the
following,
∂λsao1:t
∂σs′a′o1:t
=
1√
2pi
exp
(
− (µs′a′o1:t − c)2
2
(
σs′a′o1:t
)2
)
(3.11)
dσs
′a′
o1:t
dns′a′
= − σσ
3
0
2 (ns′a′σ20 + σ
2)
3
2
(3.12)
∂λsao1:t
∂µs′a′o1:t
=
1
2
(
1 + erf
(√
2
(
µs
′a′
o1:t
− c)
2σs′a′o1:t
))
(3.13)
dµs
′a′
o1:t
dns′a′
=
σ2σ20
(−µ0 + rˆs′a′t )
(ns′a′)2σ40 + 2n
s′a′σ2σ20 + σ
4
, (3.14)
combining these, for a computation ωs′a′ , that provides information about 〈s′, a′〉, we get
∂λsao1:t
∂ns′a′
=
∂λsao1:t
∂σs′a′o1:t
dσs
′a′
o1:t
dns′a′
+
∂λsao1:t
∂µs′a′o1:t
dµs
′a′
o1:t
dns′a′
. (3.15)
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Here, we consider the partial derivative of λsao1:t with respect to n
s′a′ , because there are po-
tentially multiple such 〈s′, a′〉 that can impact λsao1:t . Broadly,
∂λsao1:t
∂ns′a′ enables us to quantify
the impact of sampling from a frontier node on root actions, when s is the root state, a is a
root action, and 〈s′, a′〉 is a frontier state-action. Subsequently, we can utilize the following
approximations for a computation ωs′a′ that provides information about 〈s, a〉,
VOC(ωs
′a′ ;ψn, o1:t, s) ≈ Eo∼ωs′a′ [max
a∈As
λsao1:t⊕o]−maxa∈As λ
sa
o1:t
(3.16)
≈ E
[
max
a∈As
[
λsao1:t + η∂λ
sa
o1:t
/∂ns
′a′
]]
−max
a∈As
λsao1:t (3.17)
= max
a∈As
[
λsao1:t + η∂λ
sa
o1:t
/∂ns
′a′
]
−max
a∈As
λsao1:t , (3.18)
setting α = maxa∈As λsao1:t , we can further simplify by the following approximation
max
a∈As
[
λsao1:t + η∂λ
sa
o1:t
/∂nsa
] ≈ λsαo1:t + η∂λsαo1:t/∂ns′a′ , (3.19)
which we justify later. Inserting this into Equation 3.18, we get
VOC(ωs
′a′ ;ψn, o1:t, s) ≈ η∂λsαo1:t/∂ns
′a′ , (3.20)
where η term can be ignored for arg max-ing the VOC approximation as it is a constant
for the current state s . This equation is intuitive, as it suggests, one could find the most
promising root action—that is, α = maxa∈As λsao1:t—and then find the 〈s′, a′〉 that will have
the biggest impact of λsαo1:t by arg max-ing ∂λ
sα
o1:t
/∂ns
′a′ . However, λsαo1:t is an upper bound. As
such, its maximization is not well justified. In order to remedy this, we utilize the optimistic
initialization heuristic that is widely used in reinforcement learning by initializing the Z-
valued (or Y -values) optimistically such that ∂λsαo1:t/∂n
s′a′ is non-positive in expectation, i.e.,
Eo1:t
[
∂λsαo1:t/∂n
s′a′
] ≤ 0. In fact, it follows from Equation 3.15 that ∂λsao1:t/∂ns′a′ < 0 if
rˆs
′a′
t < µ0 suggesting that we would expect dynamic values to decrease with each computation
if the prior is sufficiently optimistic.
Putting these together, we now put forward the Upper Expectation Bound (UEB) algo-
rithm, which functions in four steps as illustrated in Figure 3.1.2
3.1.3 VOC(φn)-greedy policy
For the VOC(φn)-greedy policy, we need to compute max〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable E[Y (s′, a′|o1:t)]
and max〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable E[Y (s′, a′|o1:t⊕o)]. The former is easy, as it is composed of picking
the highest posterior mean. The latter is also relatively to compute if Y -function is jointly
Normally distributed, whether be independent as in Example 1 or be dependent as we discuss
later on in this chapter.
3.2 Stochastic state transitions
This analysis assumed deterministic transitions so far. If the transitions are stochastic, then we
cannot collapse ψn and φn into single E and max operators as we have done in Equations 3.1
and 3.2. This is because in the n-step optimal value equation, each step involves an expectation
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Figure 3.2: Schematic description of the Upper Expectation Bound algorithm for an environ-
ment with deterministic state transitions. A: A partial search graph (or tree) is formed by
expanding the current state s along all directions for n steps. In this illustration, n = 1 for
simplicity. B: Y -values on the frontier are propagated up to the root actions. Using these val-
ues, upper bounds for dynamic values of root actions are calculated, which are denoted with λ.
C: The root action with the highest potential is determined, which is a2, and then the frontier
node that will have the highest impact on λsa2o1:t is selected, which is 〈s2, a0〉. D: A computation
is performed upon 〈s2, a0〉 to obtain better information. In the case of Monte Carlo tree search
methods, which we introduce later, this computation would involve performing a roll-out (i.e.,
trajectory simulation).
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over the state transition probabilities, and a max over actions—unlike in the deterministic
settings, where we only had nested max’s, which could be collapsed into a single max. In
this stochastic case, φn can be computed by propagating the expected leaf values up the graph,
which is equivalent to the backward induction method in game theory. For computing ψn, the
same procedure can be applied by combining backward induction with sampling leaf values
and averaging.
Alternatively, we can approximate ψn by using the upper bound given by,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) ≤ ET
[
EY
[
max
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable under T
Y (s′, a′|o1:t)
]]
. (3.21)
where T : S ×A → S is a deterministic transition function distributed according to Pas·, such
that ∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ A : T (s, a) ∼ Pas·. Then, we can replace the inner expectation with the LR
bound and obtain,
ψn(s, a|o1:t) ≤ ET
[
λsao1:t(T )
]
, (3.22)
where
λsao1:t(T ) = c+
∑
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable under T
[
(σs
′a′)2F s
′a′(c) + (µs
′a′ − c)
[
1− F s′a′(c)
]]
.
(3.23)
3.3 Dealing with correlations
Assuming independent sources simplify the VOC computations greatly. However, if correla-
tions do exists among the optimal state-action values, treating them as independent will result
in a unnecessarily high sample complexity. In other words, we can exploit correlations to learn
action values with a fewer number of samples.
This can be realized by, for instance, assuming a Gaussian process prior, or a conjugate
multivariate Normal prior over the joint distribution of frontier state-action values. Let q be
a vector composed of Q∗-values of the frontier nodes, whose elements are denoted with a
superscript, e.g. qi. Assume q ∼ N (µ0,Σ0) where µ0 is a prior mean vector and Σ0 is a
covariance matrix with elements Kij = Cov(qi, qj). As before, computations allow noisy
observations, e.g., for time t, we can observe rit = q
i + it where 
i
t ∼ N (0, τ−1i ) i.i.d.. The
posterior distribution q|o1:t can be obtained efficiently using the multivariate conjugate Normal
prior.
Specifically, we obtain the posterior q|o1:t ∼ N (µt,Σt) where
µt = µt−1 +
rit − µit
τ i + Σiit−1
Σ:it−1 , (3.24)
Σt = Σt−1 − Σ
:i
t−1(Σ
:i
t−1)
T
τ i + Σiit−1
, (3.25)
where Σ:it−1 denotes the ith column of Σt−1. If Σ0 is constructed using a parametric kernel
function, its parameters can be optimized, for example by maximizing the likelihood function
via gradient descent.
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Note that, the posterior obtained here is equivalent to the Gaussian process (GP) posterior.
If there are N many frontier nodes, the joint conjugate multivariate Normal posterior can be
computed in O(N2), whereas the GP formulation requires O(t3 + Nt2) steps, as the fitting
requires inverting a t × t matrix, and getting the posterior means and variances of N nodes
requires an additional Nt2 steps. Therefore, there is no advantage to using GPs unless t N .
Alternatively, instead of optimizing the parameters of Σ0, one can also set a conjugate
prior for Σ0 by assuming it is distributed according to the Wishart distribution.
Recall that the Y -function is the posterior of the Q∗-function given o1:t, corrected by γ and
immediate rewards. We showed that we can update Y efficiently, but we also need to be able
to compute VOC’s efficiently. For φn, we need to evaluate
Eo
[
max
〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable
E[Y (s′, a′|o1:t ⊕ o)]
]
. (3.26)
Here, the maximum is over a random vector, which is jointly Gaussian. However, all the ran-
domness is caused by o ∈ R. Thus, the joint posterior lies on a single dimensional manifold,
where Eq 3.26 is piece-wise linear in o and thus its expectation can be computed efficiently in
O(N2 logN) [13]. However, EY
[
max〈s′,a′〉 is n step reachable Y (s′, a′|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
is not piecewise-
linear with respect to o. Thus, we need to resort to approximate methods, such as Monte
Carlo sampling or variational inference for computing the VOC(ψn)-greedy policy. UEB,
which approximates the VOC(ψn)-greedy policy, could also exploit the correlation in princi-
ple. However, the derivation of gradient equations remains as a potential direction for future
work.
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Chapter 4
Value of Computation for Planning
“You must compose your life action by action, and be satisfied if each action achieves
its own end as can be.”
– Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
In this chapter, we give a concrete realization of VOC-greedy policies based on Monte
Carlo tree search (MCTS). To this end, we first discuss MCTS in further detail first. Then,
we derive new MCTS algorithms that value actions based on our theory of static and dynamic
values, and select VOC-maximizing simulations (i.e., rollouts). Finally, we compare our ap-
proach to other popular or relevant MCTS methods.
4.1 Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS)
MCTS algorithms function by incrementally and stochastically building a search tree to ap-
proximate state-action values. This incremental growth prioritizes the promising regions of
the search space by directing the growth of the tree towards high value states. To elaborate, a
tree policy is used to traverse the search tree and select a node which is not fully expanded—
meaning, it has immediate successors that aren’t included in the tree. Then, the node is ex-
panded once by adding one of it’s unexplored children to the tree, from which a trajectory
simulated for a fixed number of steps or until a terminal state is reached. Such trajectories
are generated using a rollout policy; which is typically fast to compute—for instance random
and uniform. The outcome of this trajectory— i.e., cumulative discounted rewards along the
trajectory—is used to update the value estimates of the nodes in the tree that lie along the path
from the root to the expanded node.
The goal of MCTS is to select the action at the root with the highest expected value (EV),
that is Q∗. This is usually achieved via estimating EVs of root actions from the returns of
the samples collected. The quality of the chosen action depends primarily on the tree policy
rather than the roll-out policy. UCT [10] and its variants are perhaps the most widely used tree
policies. For UCT, which we introduce formally later, the EV of a root action is estimated
via the sample mean returns of all rollouts performed from descendant nodes of the root ac-
tion. The quality of these estimates depends on how the tree policy distributes computational
effort. Next, we describe UCT in more as well as a modified version of it, which leverages
computation values for the tree policy at the root node.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic description of MCTS. MCTS methods four components: (I) Selecting
a node which has a successor not included in the tree. This node is also referred to as the
leaf. Selection of a leaf is determined by a tree policy. (II) A successor of the chosen leaf
is added to the tree. (III) A rollout (i.e., trajectory) is sampled using a rollout policy. (IV)
Cumulative discounted rewards obtained from the rollout is propagated and backed-up up the
tree. Reprinted with permission from [19].
4.1.1 UCT
Upper Confidence Bounds applied to trees (UCT) [10] adapts a successful multi-armed bandit
algorithm called UCB1 to MCTS. More specifically, UCT’s tree policy applies the UCB1
algorithm recursively down the tree starting from the root node. At each level, UCT selects
the most promising child using
arg max
ν′ is a child of ν
Qˆ(ν ′) + c
√
2 logN(ν)
N(ν ′)
(4.1)
where N(ν ′) is the number of times the node ν ′ is visited, and Qˆ(ν ′) is the average rewards
obtained by performing a rollout from ν ′ or one of its descendants, and c is a positive constant,
which is typically selected empirically. The second term assigns higher scores to nodes that
are visited less frequently. As such, it can be thought of as an exploration bonus.
UCT is simple and has successfully been utilized for many applications. However, it
has also been noted [4, 12] that UCT’s goal is different from that of approximate planning.
UCT attempts to ensure a high net simulated worth for the actions that are taken during the
Monte Carlo simulations that comprise planning. However, all that actually matters is the real
worth of the single action that is ultimately taken in the world after all the simulations have
terminated. Failing to simulate an action because of a low simulated net worth might slow
down discovery of its superior or inferior quality. This problem has been partially address by
leveraging information values—which shifts the focus from the quality of imaginary scenarios
to the quality of the immediate real actions—as we explain next.
4.1.2 VOI-based tree policy
Tolpin and Shimony [12] and Hay et. al. [4] tackle the the aforementioned problem of UCT
by suggesting a hybrid sampling scheme in which the policy for searching the tree employs
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UCT at actions one step beneath the root, but calculates value of information (VOI) estimates
for the root actions as illustrated in Figure 4.2. VOIs quantify the worth of the information that
is expected to be gained from a simulation about the ultimate choice, rather than the expected
worth of the simulation itself. These authors demonstrated empirically that even this simple
modification could result in significant performance improvements over UCT.
UCT Layer
VOI-based Layer
Figure 4.2: VOI-based is a hybrid algorithm, leveraging VOI’s for the root actions, and UCT
for the rest.
We can map the VOI definition used in these works to the definitions we have given
in Chapter 2.5. Specifically, VOI in [4, 12] is equivalent to using 1-step static values (i.e.,
φ1(s, a|o1:t)) for valuing root actions, and maximizing their respective VOC′’s as defined in
Equation 2.54. Specifically,
VOI(ω; o1:t, s) = VOC′(ω;φ1, o1:t, s) (4.2)
= Eo∼ω
[
max
a∈As
φ1(s, a|o1:t ⊕ o)− φ1(s, arg max
a∈As
φ1(s, a|o1:t)|o1:t ⊕ o)
]
(4.3)
Consequently, we can point out three major limitations of VOI’s as utilized by these stud-
ies, compared to our formulations:
• Evaluating computation values only for the root node of the tree. Perhaps the most
significant shortcoming, as the authors also point out, is that the VOI-based algorithms
only compute computation values concerning the root nodes. In other words, computa-
tion values are utilized only for choosing the most promising immediate subtree, then
UCT is utilized for picking the best node to sample from within the subtree.
We know that as n increases, φn(s, a|o1:t) approaches Q∗(s, a), independent of t. How-
ever, VOI-based algorithms value actions according to φ1(s, a|o1:t) which is likely to
be too crude in many cases. VOC-greedy algorithms can work with any n. Thus, they
offer not only better value representations, but also the ability to select computations in
a finer granularity.
• Not accounting for distal policy improvement. As discussed in Chapter 2.5, VOC′
underestimates the gain due to a computation—as it is only concerned with the pol-
icy improvement at the root state—ignoring the effect of policy improvement in other
states. Note that this is orthogonal to the point raised above as VOC′(ω;φn, o1:t, s) ≤
VOC(ω;φn, o1:t, s) for n > 1 as well.
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• Not accounting for optionality. As we have discussed in Chapter 2.5, the cardinal
difference between ψn and φn is that the former also takes the uncertainties in action
values into account, whereas the latter only accounts for the expectations.
From an economics perspective, the difference between the dynamic and static values
(i.e., ψn − φn) can be considered as the value of optionality—as it reflects how much
one can possibly gain by changing one’s mind in the light of new information. In other
words, VOC(ψn)-greedy pays a cost in terms of potentially choosing the action with
lower expected value given what is known now, but maintains the flexibility of allowing
itself to find greater values in the future by the time the agent will have changed state
and will have sampled further.
4.2 The Value of Computation in MCTS
In the previous chapter, we have shown that VOC(φn) can be calculated with reasonable effi-
ciency, and gave an approximation for VOC(ψn), which is otherwise very costly to compute.
We now give a more complete and concrete picture by describing how VOC(φn/ψn)-greedy
can be used for MCTS.
As in the VOI-based algorithm, we have hybrid scheme, where we utilize UCT as a sub-
routine to obtain information about states that lie beyond the spatial horizon. As illustrated in
Algorithm 1, we keep track of the state of UCT trees for previously sampled frontier nodes.
That is, each time a frontier node is sampled, UCT subroutine will be invoked, which will in
turn expand the tree by a single node, from which a roll-out will be performed. We leverage
UCT for sampling frontier nodes, rather than directly performing a roll-out from the fron-
tier node itself, as the value estimated by UCT will converge to the optimal value (i.e., Q∗)
asymptotically. The reason for utilizing VOC’s for the top of the tree/graph—meaning closer
to the root/sink—and UCT policy for the bottom part is that the tree policy on the bottom
has a smaller impact compared to the one at the top due to discounting among other reasons.
Therefore, it is more efficient to save the relatively expensive VOC computations for the top
nodes, and utilize the UCT policy—which can be cheaply evaluated—for the rest.
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Algorithm 1: VOC(φn/ψn)-greedy for MCTS
Input: Current state s
Output: Selected action α to perform
1 Create a partial search graph/tree by expanding state s for n steps ;
2 Initialize the computation set Ω = {〈s′, a′〉 : 〈s′, a′〉 is n step reachable from s} ;
3 Initialize a partial function U , that maps states to UCT trees ;
4 t← 0; o1:t ← [] ; /* o1:t is an empty vector */
5 Initialize φn/ψn ;
6 repeat
7 〈s∗, a∗〉 = arg maxω∈Ω VOC(ω;φn/ψn, o1:t, s) ;
8 s† ∼ T (s∗, a∗, ·) ;
9 if U(s†) is not defined then
10 Initialize a UCT-tree rooted at s† ;
11 Define U(s†), which maps to the UCT-tree from the previous step ;
12 end
13 Expand U(s†) and perform a roll-out once ;
14 Store the roll-out return in o, together with the 〈s∗, a∗〉 information ;
15 o1:t+1 ← o1:t ⊕ o; t← t+ 1 ;
16 Update φn/ψn using o1:t ;
17 until computation budget is reached (OR maxω∈Ω VOC(ω;φn/ψn, o1:t, s) < C);
18 α = arg maxa∈As φn/ψn(s, a|o1:t) ;
Similarly, UEB can also easily be adapted to MCTS. In Algorithm 1, we need to replace
Line 7 with arg min〈s′,a′〉∈Ω ∂λsαo1:t/∂n
s′a′ where α = arg maxa∈As λsao1:t . Then, when selecting
the final action to take, Line 18 should be replaced with α = arg maxa∈As λsao1:t as well.
Incorporation of new information is accomplished in Line 16 by for example using inde-
pendent, or dependent, conjugate Normal priors.
Note that instead of uniformly expanding a search graph as done in Line 1, one can, in
principle, incrementally and asymmetrically build a tree as done in MCTS. In this case, at a
given time there will be a number of frontier state-actions which we can expand. Therefore, we
could compute the static and dynamics values of root actions by trickling the values of these
frontier nodes up to the root. However, the problem is, all the previous computations would
have been performed upon the nodes that lie between the root and the frontier. Therefore, one
needs further assumptions to be able to relate the information about the intermediary nodes to
the frontier nodes. One possible way to relate values of state-actions of different depths is to
treat the depth as a context of a bandit problem and use GPs as in [20].
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Chapter 5
Experiments
“If the wise man cannot benefit himself, his wisdom is vain.”
– Ennius (quoted by Cicero), Medea
In the previous section, we discuss a VOC-greedy policy can be utilized in an MCTS set-
ting. Here we benchmark VOC-greedy policies, implemented as MCTS tree policies, against
some of the most popular and/or relevant policies, namely UCT [10], VOI-based [4], Bayes
UCT [21], and Thompson sampling for MCTS [22] in two different environments. We first
introduce the latter two of the aforementioned policies. Then, we move on to the experiment
environments, and their respective results.
5.1 Benchmark policies
Among the four MCTS policies we evaluate against VOC-greedy algorithms, we have al-
ready discussed UCT and VOI-based in Section 4.1. Now we briefly discuss Bayes UCT and
Thompson sampling.
What we refer to as Bayes UCT is a Bayesian version of UCT by Tesauro et. al. [21].
Bayes UCT assumes normally distributed action values, and estimates their mean and scale
parameters using conjugate Normal priors. Given the posterior estimations, the tree policy
uses a UCT-like scoring which is a function of the posterior mean and scale parameters. Like
VOC-greedy policies, Bayes UCT too assumes a fixed spatial horizon, and propagates the
estimated action values up the tree. Therefore, its computational cost is similar to that of
VOC(φn)-greedy. In our implementation, we use UCT to obtain samples for nodes that lie
beyond the spatial horizon as we also do for VOC(φn)-greedy.
Bai et. al. [22] adapts Thompson sampling—a widely used, optimal bandit policy—to
MCTS. In the original publication, authors use conjugate Dirichlet and Normal-Gamma dis-
tributions to estimate action values. However, in order to conform with our implementations
of Bayes UCT and VOC-greedy, we use conjugate Normal priors with known variance instead
of using Normal-Gamma. The tree policy uses Thompson sampling recursively down the tree
by drawing action value samples from the posterior distributions and choosing the action with
the highest value sample.
For the experiments we explain next, we select the hyperparameters of all the policies
using grid search.
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5.2 Bandit-trees
The first environment in which we evaluate the aforementioned MCTS methods is an MDP
composed of a complete binary tree of a varying depth d. The leaves of the tree are the bandit
arms, whose expected rewards are sampled from a multivariate Gaussian distribution. The
non-leaf nodes are the states. At the each state, the agent needs to choose between LEFT and
RIGHT actions. LEFT transitions to the left subtree (of depth d − 1) with probability p and
to the right subtree with probability 1 − p. The same holds for RIGHT, but with swapped
transition probabilities. In Figure 5.2, we illustrate a bandit tree of depth 3.
Figure 5.1: A bandit tree of depth 3. Circles denote states, and squares denote bandit arms.
We allocate a fixed computational budget to all methods. Each computation allows the
actor to sample a single bandit arm, which is determined by the tree policy of the agent. After
using up the budget, the agent needs to take an action. In this experiment, we are concerned
with the quality of the very first action (taken at the root node), as quantified by the simple
regret for computation time t as,
SR(ROOT, pit) := max
a∈{LEFT,RIGHT}
Q∗(ROOT, a)−Q∗(ROOT, pit(ROOT)) , (5.1)
assuming a deterministic policy pit : S → A—as all the aforementioned MCTS policies are
deterministic1. Note that pi is subscripted by t, as the policy depends on the past computations.
There are different dimensions along which we can vary the environment, such as the depth
of trees, and transition probabilities. However, our simulations show that the distribution from
which the expected bandit rewards are sampled is perhaps the most detrimental—especially
the degree of correlation among the arms. Therefore, we present the results of two conditions
here, one in which the expected bandit arm rewards are correlated, and one in which they are
not.
For the correlated case, we obtain the exact form of correlation as the following. We
assume that the bandit arms lie uniformly spaced on a line with unit spacing. For example, for
trees of depth 7, where there are 128 bandits whose respective coordinates are 0, 1, . . . , 127.
1Note to be confused by meta-policies such tree policies or rollout policies, which can be non-deterministic.
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Then, we obtain the covariance matrix Σ using a kernel function, where the distances among
the bandits can be computed from their coordinates. The expected bandit rewards are sampled
from N (0.5,Σ) i.i.d. for each environment instance. The agent cannot observe the expected
rewards directly, but can have noisy samples of them by performing computations, where the
noise is drawn from N (0, 0.01) i.i.d.. For the uncorrelated case, we use a white-noise kernel
function.
In our implementations of the algorithms, VOC-greedy and Bayes-UCT have a fixed spa-
tial horizon of 4. That is, they unroll the current state for 4 steps, resulting in 24 = 16 many
frontier nodes. We estimate the posterior values of these frontier nodes by assuming a conju-
gate multivariate prior over the set of frontier nodes for both methods.
Figure 5.2 shows the results in the case with correlated bandit arms. We see that VOC(φn)-
greedy overperforms all other methods. However, this might be because VOC(φn)-greedy can
quickly learn and exploit the correlations. In order to control for this, we can also look at a
case where the bandit expected rewards are uncorrelated, or equivalently, sampled from a
white noise kernel. Results of which are presented in Figure 5.3. As we can see VOC(φn)-
greedy and Bayes UCT performs equally well, and better than the other policies. This implies
that the good performance of VOC(φn)-greedy is not solely explotaiton of the correlation
structure.
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Figure 5.2: Mean regret (over 10k environment samples) as a function of computation budget
for bandit-trees with correlated expected bandit rewards. The plots include mean squared
error bars, which are too small to be visible.
5.3 Peg solitaire
Peg solitaire—also known as Solitaire, Solo, or Solo Noble—is a single-player board game.
The game takes place on a board, where some holes are occupied by pegs. A valid move is
to move a peg over a neighboring peg into a new unoccupied position two positions away,
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Figure 5.3: Mean regret (over 5k environment samples) as a function of computation budget
for bandit-trees with uncorrelated expected bandit rewards. Panel a includes mean squared
error bars.
and then to remove the neighboring peg as illustrated in Figure 5.4. The objective, for our
purposes, is to minimize the number of pegs remaining on the board.
Figure 5.4: Illustration of how pegs move. The bottom left peg is moved up, by skipping over
its neighbor—which is then removed from the board.
We use a smaller board than the standard game because, especially in mid-game branching
factor is rather high2. More specifically, for the results we present here, we use a 4× 4 board,
with 9 pegs randomly placed. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.5, which are averaged over
200 initial board position samples.
We can see that VOC(φn)-greedy performs the best for small budget ranges, which is in
line with our intuition as φn is a more accurate valuation of action values for small computation
budgets. For large budgets, we see that VOC(ψn)-greedy performs as well as Thompson
sampling, and better than the rest.
The performance of VOC-greedy algorithms is perhaps not as good in peg solitaire com-
pared to the previous environment. However, we should also point out that, our implementa-
tions of VOC-greedy algorithms here assume that action values are independent, even though
they are not in reality. Learning of the correlations is especially important for environments
with high branching. Consider having a search tree of depth 2 with branching factor of 20.
2For example four pegs arranged a square form results in eight possible moves. Though, typically branching
factor is in the order of number of pegs on the board.
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Figure 5.5: The average number of pegs remaining on the board as a function of the computa-
tion budget. The bars denote the mean squared errors.
Then there are 202 = 400 leaves. In order to have a reasonable estimate of the leaf values,
each leafs needs to be sampled multiple times, which requires a few thousand samples. How-
ever, the same could be done with way fewer samples if the correlations can be estimated
reasonably well.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
“I am satisfied if each day I make some reduction in the number of vices and find
fault with my mistakes.”
– Seneca, De Vita Beata
We concentrated our efforts in addressing the question of how one should value compu-
tations when planning. We provided an exact answer to this question for a simple class of
MDPs1. Based on this, we proposed planning algorithms for approximately solving the gen-
eral class of MDPs, and provided performance guarantees. In the experiments section, we
demonstrated that our algorithms perform as well as the best of the state-of-the-art in many
instances. Below we discuss certain areas in which our solutions fall short, and improvements
are possible.
6.1 Possible areas of improvement
We divide shortcomings of our approaches and possible improvements we see into two sec-
tions: theoretical, which mostly pertains to how we define static and dynamic values, and
the value of computation; and practical, which mostly concerns practical implementations of
VOC-greedy, especially for MCTS.
6.1.1 Theoretical
Filling in between static and dynamic values
The algorithms we propose either use static or dynamic values, which respectively assume
zero or infinitely many future computations. If the number of future computations is known,
our formulation in principle allows for valuing the root actions accordingly—that is, using a
value that falls between static and dynamic values, reflecting the budget. However, to do that,
one must somehow determine how those computation would be distributed among the frontier
nodes, for which we have no principled answers.
If this problem could be addressed, then the next question would be how many compu-
tations should one predict performing before taking an action? This, in turn, would allow
1Where the agent ends up in a terminal state after n actions, and receives a final reward, the value of which
can be estimated by performing computations.
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forming even more accurate value estimates. For example, given a problem, if the agent cor-
rectly predicts performing 10 computations2 before taking an action, then the solution of the
problem stated above would give the optimal way to value actions.
Sparser trees and sampling
For computing static and dynamic values, we assume a fixed spatial horizon of n. How-
ever, this severely limits the practical applications of our theory, as performing full Bellman-
backups for n-steps can be very costly, especially in environments with high branching fac-
tors. This could be remedied by incorporating sparse sampling, and growing a sparse tree
adaptively, rather than using full backups for a fixed spatial horizon.
This, however, is a theoretically challenging problem. Under our assumptions, it is easy to
quantify the impact of an additional sample on the value of an action. However, quantifying
the impact of expanding a node, which we think is necessary, is much harder.
VOC for offline updates
There are many reinforcement learning and planning algorithms that sample a set random tran-
sitions from past experiences (or from a model), and apply Q-learning-like updates. Examples
include Dyna [23] and prioritized sweeping [24]. Our current proposal can only select compu-
tations concerning actions that are directly related to the current state, which we do via n-step
values. Being able to do the same for arbitrary state-actions would yield a more principled
version of prioritized sweeping.
One possible way of achieving this is through successor representations (SRs) [25] as re-
cently done by Matter and Daw [26]—where the authors suggest that (human) hippocampal
replay selects offline updates to maximize a VOC-like measure. However, the SR-based mea-
sure will be rather inflexible and underestimate computation values, given SRs are based on
fixed policies3 or on a combination of past policies4, and as such, are incapable of accounting
for possible future policies unlike VOC(ψn)-greedy.
Stopping criterion
For the most part, we conducted our analysis as well as the experiments using a fixed compu-
tation budget. This is in fact the standard in MCTS applications, where computation budgets
are determined a priori using heuristics.
An important advantage of calculating VOCs is that it naturally lends itself to adaptive
stopping criteria [4]. A simple use is that a computation is performed if and only if the VOC
is higher than a threshold as in Equation 2.14. How to set this threshold is an open question.
2One could also be Bayesian about predicting the future number of computations, as well as about the previ-
ous open problem.
3If SRs are computed from a model directly.
4If SRs are computed via a temporal-difference mechanism.
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6.1.2 Practical
Learning correlations
As we discuss in the experiments sections, being able to learn the correlations of frontier
action values is detrimental for performing well. We achieve this by obtaining a assuming
prior covariance (given by the kernel), and then performing Bayesian updates. However, there
are many scenarios where finding a good kernel might require some “feature engineering”.
This is a disadvantage of our VOC-greedy implementations, as it does not necessarily function
well “off the shelf”.
Efficient computing of φ and ψ in stochastic environments
We provide two ways of handling stochastic transitions for computing φ and ψ (see Sec-
tion 3.2): (I) numerically computing the exact solution; (II) sampling deterministic transitions
based on the transition probabilities, and taking the expectation—which is not exact but forms
an upper bound, but at a cheaper cost. Given the ubiquity of stochastic environments, having
better algorithms here would have great practical value.
Meta-computational costs
In the experiments section, we show that our VOC-greedy algorithms perform better than most
of the state-of-the-art given the same number of computations (i.e., rollouts). However, there
are significant difference in the number meta-computations—that is, computations used for
selecting the rollout-level computations—these policies perform. Especially, computing the
VOC(ψ)-greedy policy is very costly. VOC(φ)-greedy has a comparable meta-computational
cost to that of Bayes UCT and Thompson sampling, but only if the transitions are determinis-
tic.
6.2 Final thoughts
We provide a normative theory of how computations should be valued in a planning setting.
Our work overcomes some of the significant limitations of existing VOC-like measures for
planning by extending computation values to non-immediate actions and by accounting for
the impact of possible future computations. Even though these improvements come at a
large (meta-)computational cost, limiting its immediate practical applications, we hope that
by defining what the value of a computations is more accurately, we can understand planing
better, and thus plan better.
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